

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-08

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P 220835Z FEB 78

FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5334

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BELGRADE 1420

LIMDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 3. CORRECTED)

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, YO

SUBJ: MEETING WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN SECRETARY MOJSOV -- CSCE

SUMMARY: MOJSOV INVITED THE AMBASSADOR IN THIS MORNING (FEBRUARY 21) TO DISCUSS THE PRESENT STATE OF THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS. HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR CONCLUDING THE MEETING WITH A SUBSTANTIVE DOCUMENT AND URGED THAT THE CONFEREES NOW LOOK TO DRAFTING A FINAL DOCUMENT CONTAINING POINTS ALREADY AGREED UPON. MATTERS ON WHICH AGREEMENT IS CLOSE SHOULD BE BRACKETED AND DISCUSSED FURTHER, AND A THIRD LISTING SHOULD REGISTER THOSE ISSUES ON WHICH THERE IS NO AGREEMENT. THE AMBASSADOR ASSURED MOJSOV THAT THE US OBJECTIVE IS FOR THE MOST SUBSTANTIVE DOCUMENT POSSIBLE AND THE US IS ANXIOUS TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS TO ACHIEVE SUCH A DOCUMENT.

HOWEVER, ALL APPEARS TO DEPEND ON THE SOVIETS AND WHAT, IF ANYTHING, THEY ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS. MOJSOV SAID THAT WHILE HE WAS DISCUSSING THIS MATTER WITH THE AMBASSADOR, TITO HAD SENT A LETTER TO BREZHNEV (WHICH YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR SMOLE DELIVERED ON FEB 17) AND THE ISSUE WAS BEING RAISED IN SEVERAL WEST EUROPEAN CAPITALS. CONFIDENTIAL

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MOJSOV IMPLIED THAT THE LETTER TO BREZHNEV CONTAINED MUCH TOUGHER LANGUAGE THAN USED BY TITO IN THE CSCE PORTION OF HIS FEB 12 LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER. END SUMMARY.

1. MOJSOV REFERRED TO TITO'S FEB 12 LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER AND THE SECTIONS ON CSCE, ASKING THE AMBASSADOR FOR THE US ASSESSMENT ON THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY.

MENTIONING THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED CSCE WITH JUSTICE GOLDBERG THAT MORNING, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE US OBJECTIVE IS TO ACHIEVE THE MOST SUBSTANTIVE FINAL DOCUMENT POSSIBLE. HE SAID THESE WERE HIS VIEWS, THOSE OF JUSTICE GOLDBERG; AND THOSE OF THE USG. THE US DOES NOT WANT A SHORT ANODYNE STATEMENT. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE NEED FOR CONSENSUS, THERE MAY BE NO ALTERNATIVE, ESPECIALLY IF THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO SAY "NO, WE WON'T DISCUSS ANY PAPERS BUT OURS." HE SAID THE US HAS MADE STATEMENTS SUPPORTING PARTS OF THE NNA DRAFT AND HAS BEEN MORE THAN WILLING TO DISCUSS ALL ITS PROVISIONS. THE SOVIETS, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAVE REMAINED INTRANSIGENT. THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S STRONG SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S STAND ON HUMAN RIGHTS WOULD MAKE IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCEPT A LESS THAN SUBSTANTIVE DOCUMENT. HELSINKI IS AN IMPORTANT PROCESS AND BELGRADE IS AN IMPORTANT STEP WITHIN THAT PROCESS; THIS SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.

2. MOJSOV DECLARED IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SATISFY EVERYONE. WHAT IS NEEDED, HE SAID, IS A COMMON STATEMENT OF WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN AGREED UPON. CERTAIN CONCRETE AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN REACHED BY ALL DELEGATIONS. TITO EXPRESSED THESE VIEWS IN HIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER AND IN A MESSAGE DELIVERED TO BREZHNEV ON FEB 17. THE GOY WOULD LIKE THE GREAT POWERS TO HELP
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ACHIEVE A SUBSTANTIVE DOCUMENT. FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD BE REPEATED IN INTERNATIONAL LIFE, BECAUSE A "SMALL RESULT" WOULD AFFECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE SUPER-POWERS ON OTHER ISSUES.

3. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THERE WAS NO DISAGREEMENT WITH THE POINTS TITO MADE TO PRESIDENT CARTER. ON THE QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE, HE SAID THE US WOULD PROBABLY WANT MORE THAN YUGOSLAVIA, BUT THAT THAT IS NEGOTIABLE. HE REMARKED THAT ONE OF THE REASONS THAT A US/WESTERN PAPER HAD NOT BEEN TABLED EARLIER WAS TO DETERMINE IF THE NNA DRAFT COULD BECOME THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. AT NO TIME HAS THE US BEEN UNWILLING TO NEGOTIATE. HOWEVER, NOW THERE APPEARS TO BE NO WAY TO BREAK THROUGH THE LOG JAM SHORT OF A SOVIET STATEMENT THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE."

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BELGRADE 1420

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4. MOJSOV EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE US HAVING REFRAINED FROM TABLING ITS OWN DRAFT, SAYING THAT THE PROLIFERATION OF PAPERS WOULD HAVE CAUSED PROBLEMS. HE REITERATED THAT THE CONFEREES HAVE TO BEGIN WITH SOMETHING AND CAN BEGIN WITH THE ISSUES ALREADY AGREED UPON SUCH AS: VENUE FOR THE NEXT MEETING; AN EXPERTS' MEETING ON CBMS; ANOTHER MEETING ON THE MEDITERRANEAN; AND SPECIFIC MATTERS ADVANCING COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES SUCH AS IN THE ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL FIELDS. ALL THIS SHOULD BE INCLUDED. HE THEN SUGGESTED ANOTHER REGISTER WHICH WOULD CONTAIN THOSE POINTS ON WHICH AGREEMENT WAS CLOSE, AND A THIRD REGISTER WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE ISSUES ON WHICH AGREEMENT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE.

5. MOJSOV NOTED THAT THE DISCUSSIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN USEFUL. WHY, HE ASKED, SHOULD WHAT HAS BEEN SAID AND DONE BE DISREGARDED. HE SAID HE WAS SURPRISED IN NEW YORK TO FIND THE HIGH DEGREE OF MEDIA ATTENTION GIVEN TO CSCE. THEREFORE, HE ADDED, LISTING THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE A BAD OUTCOME.

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6. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER SUCH A DOCUMENT WOULD NOT BE CLOSE TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE MOST RECENT SOVIET DRAFT. MOJSEV DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY, ONLY REITERATING THAT ALL AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE LISTED, PARTIAL AGREEMENTS BRACKETED AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE A THIRD REGISTER ON DISAGREEMENTS.

7. TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION ON SUGGESTED MECHANICS, MOJSOV SAID THE ONLY PROBLEM WAS TO AGREE WHO WILL DRAFT THIS APPROACH. HE SUGGESTED THE "MAJOR PARTNERS" IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AGREE TO SET OUT THE THREE REGISTERS AND A LARGER DRAFTING GROUP WOULD THEN MEET TO ELABORATE WHAT WAS AGREED UPON. HE URGED THAT THE EFFORT NOT BE ABANDONED AND CERTAINLY NOT BE CONSIGNED TO A FINAL HOUR.

8. POINTING OUT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD EVIDENCED NO WILL TO NEGOTIATE ANYTHING THE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER MOJSOV WAS PLANNING A SIMILAR DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR STEPANOV. MOJSOV INDICATED THA HE IS DISCUSSING THIS MATTER DIRECTLY ONLY WITH THE US AMBASSADOR, BUT THAT SIMILAR INTERVENTIONS WERE BEING MADE THROUGH YUGOSLAVIA'S AMBASSADOR SMOLE IN MOSCOW AND IN SEVERAL WEST EUROPEAN CAPITALS, IN ADDITION TO TITO'S LETTER TO BREZHNEV. SMOLE WOULD BE TALKING IN MOSCOW WITH RODIONOV, AS WELL. MOJSOV IMPLIED THAT THE YUGOSLAV APPROACH TO THE SOVIETS, INCLUDING THE LETTER TO BREZHNEV, WAS TOUGHER THAN THE APPROACH TO THE US.

9. MOJSOV MADE A LAST PLEA FOR AGREEMENT ON A SUBSTANTIVE PAPER ESPECIALLY SINCE THE CONFERENCE HAD CONDUCTED A REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION. THE AMBASSADOR PROMISED TO REPORT MOJSOV'S CONCERNS TO JUSTICE
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GOLDBERG AND TO WASHINGTON.

10. THE FOREGOING HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED WITH JUSTICE GOLDBERG.

11. COMMENT: THE YUGOSLAVS ARE BEGINNING TO SEE THE HANDWRITING ON THE WALL: BELGRADE IS NOT HELSINKI. AND THEY DON'T LIKE IT. THEY WANT TO AVOID A SHORT COMMUNIQUE WHICH WOULD LEAD TO LABELING THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE AS A FAILURE. IF WE READ MOJSOV CORRECTLY, THE GOY WILL ACCEPT ANY DOCUMENT WHICH APPEARS "SUBSTANTIVE" -- EVEN A PRODUCT MORE AKIN TO THE SOVIET PAPER THAN ANYTHING ELSE NOW ON THE TABLE. APPARENTLY THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE NOMINATED THE USG TO BREAK THE LOGJAM.
EAGLEBURGER

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